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purposes only.”  FedEx is a commercial en-
terprise and FedEx concedes that its copying 
services are commercial in nature, and that its 
reproduction would be impermissible under 
the license if FedEx were acting as a direct 
licensee.
The court found that Great Minds’ license 
did not explicitly address whether licensees 
may engage third parties to assist them in ex-
ercising their own noncommercial use rights 
under the license. Due to the absence of any 
clear license language to the contrary, licensees 
may use third-party agents such as commercial 
reproduction services in furtherance of their 
own permitted noncommercial uses. In this 
case, because FedEx acted as the mere agent 
of licensee school districts when it reproduced 
Great Minds’ materials, and because there was 
no dispute that, the school districts themselves 
sought to use Great Minds’ materials for other 
than permissible purposes, FedEx’s activities 
did not breach the license or violate Great 
Minds’ copyright.
QUESTION:  An archivist asks about 
archival works that enter the public domain 
and what are the circumstances under which 
a user must seek permission from the archives 
to use the work.
ANSWER:  The question does not specify 
permission for what.  There are two possibil-
ities here:  copyright permission and access 
permission.  No permission is required to use 
copyrighted works by reproducing sections or 
even the entire work.  However, the archives 
control access to the work.  It owns the artifact 
and may control who, if anyone, has access 
to that work.  Usually, access is controlled to 
protect the work from damage.  Fortunately 
for users, most archives want to make works 
available to the public and that is why they are 
digitizing their collections, which both protects 
the artifact and provides access to the content.
QUESTION:  A publisher asks whether 
handwriting can be copyrighted.
ANSWER:  The short answer is no al-
though the underlying literary work certainly 
may be copyrighted.  It would have to be a font 
based on the handwriting of someone even to 
consider the issue.  One can imagine that the 
handwriting would also need to be that of a 
famous person to attract sufficient attention to 
raise the issue of copyrightability.  
Although in common speech, “typeface” 
and “font” often are used interchangeably, 
they are not the same.  A font is actually a 
file or program (when used digitally) that 
informs one’s printer or display how a letter 
or character should be shown.  A “typeface” 
is a set of letters, numbers and other symbols 
that are consistently used to compose text or 
other combination of characters.  In a typeface, 
policy for repeat offenders, implement it, and 
inform its users.
The 9th Circuit found AOL did not have 
an effective policy in place at the time due to 
the email SNAFU that had new emails falling 
into a vacuum.  Or at least evidence from 
which a reasonable juror could conclude no 
effective policy.
And So …
We go back to the trial court level for a jury 
Cases of Note
from page 49
continued on page 51
to consider the issues of contributory infringe-
ment and safe harbor protection.
In the course of plowing through this, you 
might have wondered just what the damages 
might be for the pirating of four stories.  And 
was the battle worth it?
If we can believe Variety Feb. 5, 2002, 
Ellison’s lawyer didn’t take the case on con-
tingency.  At that point, Ellison had shelled out 
$250,000 in legal bills.
But from Techdirt June 10, 2004 we learn 
that “after years of fighting, it looks like AOL 
just got fed up and has paid him off in a set-
tlement to go away.”  
QUESTION:  A middle school teacher 
asks whether it makes a difference if she 
prints copies of an article for each student 
in her class or simply provides a link to an 
online version of the article for her students.
ANSWER:  While printing copies of the 
articles for students is likely a fair use, there 
is a difference in printing versus providing a 
link for students to access the article.  Printing 
concerns the reproduction and distribution 
rights of the copyright owner, and fair use is 
an exception to that right.  Providing a link 
implicates no right of the owner.
There are practical reasons for choosing one 
over the other.  Printing copies of the articles 
for students makes sense when each student 
needs a copy in front of them for a specific 
classroom activity.  Not all students may have 
access to computers or the internet.  Further, the 
online link may not allow printing but merely 
reading on screen.  On the other hand, relying 
on a link helps train students to use the Internet 
and is most useful when students can read from 
the screen or print at the student’s choice.
QUESTION:  A college art librarian asks 
about virtual reality art creations and whether 
they qualify for copyright protection.
ANSWER:  To date, virtual reality (VR) 
has been primarily used in video games but 
there is much promise that VR will soon change 
how we search the internet and use social me-
dia.  Although still in its infancy, VR allows 
artists to use color and light and incorporate it 
with motion so that three-dimensional works 
seem to float in the air.  Not only does VR 
permit the artist to create new and different 
types of works, but it also allows viewers to 
interact with the works in ways 
not previously possible.
Section 102(a) of the 
Copyright Act defines the 
types of works that are 
eligible for copyright pro-
tection.  While VR works 
are not mentioned in the statute, the section’s 
wording indicates that new types of works can 
be protected under these eight broad categories, 
and this has occurred.  For example, in the early 
1980s, courts held that video games (not men-
tioned in section 102(a)) were copyrightable 
as audiovisual works even though the sounds 
and images varied based on manipulation by 
the players of the games.  Therefore, there is 
unlikely any difficulty with claiming copyright 
protection for these works.  As with other types 
of works, these works must be registered for 
copyright in order for to sue infringers.  Some 
speculate that enforcement of copyrights in VR 
works may be more difficult, however.
Of more concern are VR created solely 
through artificial intelligence without human 
intervention.  In the United States, only human 
authors qualify as authors for copyright purpos-
es so works created by machines or animals are 
not eligible for copyright protection.
QUESTION:  A college librarian asks 
whether schools are permitted to hire com-
mercial copy shops to produce materials for 
the classroom that were obtained under a 
Creative Commons license.
ANSWER:  This issue was recently ad-
dressed by the Second Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals in Great Minds v. FedEx Office & 
Print Services, 886 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2018). 
Great Minds is a non-profit organization that 
designs educational materials that it sells in 
book form and releases them to the public 
without charge but subject to a Creative 
Commons license.  The license allows “any 
member of the public to download, reproduce, 
and distribute the materials subject to the 
terms of the license.”  It offers 
a “worldwide, royalty-free, 
non-sublicensable, non-ex-
clusive, irrevocable license 
to ... reproduce and share 
the materials, in whole or 
in part, for noncommercial 
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design elements are repeated and consistently 
applied.  The U.S. Copyright Office Compen-
dium states that typefaces are not eligible for 
copyright protection.  This is not true in some 
European countries and Great Britain, however. 
Fonts, by contrast, may be protected by 
copyright as long as the font qualifies as 
computer software or a program and meets 
the typical requirements for copyright.  Com-
mercially created fonts are typically available 
through license agreements and the terms of the 
license apply.  Thus, in the United States, only 
the font software and not the artistic design of 
the typeface may be protected by copyright.  A 
font based on handwriting would be protect-
able, but not typeface.
QUESTION:  The manager of a campus 
bookstore asks about the recent fake textbook 
case.
ANSWER:  On April 5, 2018, the federal 
district court for the Southern District of New 
York fined Book Dog Books, a textbook sell-
ing company, $34.2 million for selling fake 
textbooks.  The court ruled in favor of the 
Educational Publishers Enforcement Group 
(comprised of Cengage, Pearson Education, 
John Wiley, and McGraw-Hill Education) 
and awarded damages for both trademark and 
copyright infringement.  Book Dog Books is 
the parent company for a number of textbook 
selling companies.  At issue were pirated 
copies and non-U.S. editions of textbooks. 
Litigation has been ongoing for a number of 
years.  According to the publishers’ attorney, 
“The jury in this case recognized the inherent 
value of textbooks and educational publishers, 
and that book distributors must exercise vig-
ilance to avoid buying and selling counterfeit 
textbooks.”  Book Dog Books has announced 
that it will appeal.  See John Wiley & Sons v. 
Book Dog Books, S.D.N.Y., April 5, 2019, case 
1:13-cv-00816-WHP-GWG.
QUESTION:  A public librarian asks 
about the huge number of copyrighted works 
that will enter the public domain in 2019.
ANSWER:  It is true that an enormous 
number of works will enter the public domain 
beginning on January 1, 2019, and each Janu-
ary thereafter.  When the Copyright Act of 1976 
was passed, the term of copyright changed 
to life of the author and 50 years;  in 1998, 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act 
increased it to life of the author plus 70 years. 
Works published between 1923 and 1963 
originally received 28 years of protection.  At 
the end of that period, they could be renewed 
for a second 28 years;  if not so renewed, they 
passed into the public domain.  The Copyright 
Act of 1976 gave those renewed an additional 
19 years of protection for a total of 75 years. 
The Sonny Bono Act also increased the max-
imum term of works published between 1923 
and 1963 to a total of 95 years.  On January 
1, 2019, works published in 1923 that are still 
protected by copyright will have reached that 
95 years of protection and will enter the public 
domain.  
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Endnotes
1.  The preamble to the EU regulation 
explains “monitoring” behavior as follows: 
“whether natural persons are tracked on 
the Internet including potential subsequent 
use of personal data processing techniques 
which consist of profiling a natural person, 
particularly in order to take decisions 
concerning her or him or for analysing or 
predicting her or his personal preferences, 
behaviours and attitudes.”
The news in the last few weeks (as well as your email inbox) seems to have been filled with references to the “GDPR.” 
Why?  Because this European Union law — 
the General Data Protection Regulation, 
(EU) 2016/679 — went into effect on May 
25, 2018, and can significantly affect not only 
European-based companies but also compa-
nies based outside the EU that do business in 
Europe.  Okay, but what about U.S. libraries? 
The short (lawyerly) answer is that the GDPR 
may or may not apply to them.
The GDPR wrought a major change in the 
territorial scope of EU data protection law.  Un-
der Article 3 of the GDPR, the Regulation ap-
plies inter alia to the “processing” of “personal 
data” of “data subjects” (i.e., individuals) who 
reside in the EU by a “controller or processor” 
that is not “established” in the EU, where the 
“processing activities” are related to: 
“(a) the offering of goods or services, 
irrespective of whether a payment of 
the data subject is required, to such data 
subjects in the [European] Union; or 
“(b) the monitoring of their behaviour as 
far as their behaviour takes place within 
the [European] Union.”
Thus, for example, a U.S. company 
is subject to the GDPR’s provisions if 
it “processes” personal data of an indi-
vidual residing in the EU when the data 
is accessed for the purpose of offering 
goods or services or of monitoring the 
individual’s behavior in the EU.  How 
does that fit with U.S. libraries?  Let’s 
walk through the analysis:
First, does your library collect “per-
sonal data”?  Sure, you do.  Every time a 
new borrower registers, you collect his or her 
name and contact information.  That’s personal 
data.  Every time, he or she checks out a book, 
that information is recorded … and what people 
are reading is very personal data.
Second, does your library collect personal 
data relating to individuals who reside in the 
EU?  Local public libraries probably don’t, but 
university and research libraries almost surely 
have some borrowers that are EU residents: 
foreign-exchange students, visiting faculty, 
and their spouses and children.
Third — and this is the most thought-pro-
voking part of the analysis — does your library 
“process” (let’s just say “use”) the personal 
data of the EU residents for the purpose of 
offering goods or services (either free or paid) 
to such individuals in the EU?  (Or possibly in 
order to “monitor” their behavior in the EU?)1 
Ask yourself what possible activities a U.S. 
library might engage in that would involve 
offering the library’s goods or service to an 
EU resident in the EU.  Suppose that a U.S. 
library sent out an email announcement to all of 
its registered borrowers inviting them to a free 
presentation by a lecturer on a topic of current 
interest and suppose further that some of those 
emails went to email addresses of borrowers 
who had moved (back) to Europe.  Technically, 
that hypothetical might fit the jurisdictional re-
quirement of the GDPR, but the library’s email 
announcement hardly seems a likely target of 
the law. (Especially since the service, i.e., the 
lecture, is not being provided in the EU.)
Of course, if the hypothetical were changed 
to one in which the U.S. library regularly 
offered some sorts of goods or services that 
would be delivered in the EU, then a different 
conclusion would seem appropriate.  In this 
circumstance — which may be far-fetched — 
the U.S. library would be well-advised to bring 
its data protection scheme into compliance 
with the GDPR.
One simple step you can take to comply 
with the GDPR is for the library to obtain ex-
plicit consent from the data subjects (e.g., the 
individual borrowers) to use their personal data 
to email information about library programs 
including offers of goods or services. 
Library registration forms often include 
this sort of routine consent, but if not, it 
is easy enough to add it.  (This is one 
reason you have recently been receiv-
ing notices of changes in Terms of Use 
agreements from vendors and others.)
There are other steps necessary for 
full compliance with the GDPR, and 
those are somewhat more complicated. 
But these systemic changes may not 
be necessary, if your library does not 
engage in the data processing activities 
that would bring it within the jurisdictional 
parameters of the GDPR.  
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